A Fracturing World
The post-Cold War order is crumbling, but what comes next may be even more unstable.
Dr. Robert Muggah is a lead principal at Secdev and cofounder of Brazil's Instituto Igarapé.
In order to step back and understand how the international order is transforming, I decided to take a few months off to study it up close. I’ve been on the road of late — currently in Baku at a global forum, finishing-up a sabbatical in Berlin, and then with plans to visit Brussels and the Baltics before returning home to Brazil. The most obvious finding is that the geopolitical landscape looks very different depending on where you’re standing.
Yet one thing remains constant regardless of where you are: the world is undergoing a period of radical and accelerating geopolitical transition. The tectonic plates of global power are radically shifting — and fast. Over the past two months, from Davos and Munich to London, Washington, and Riyadh, the signs of geopolitical fracture have become unmistakable.
To borrow from Lenin, there are decades when nothing happens, and there are days when decades happen. We are living through those days now. We are not going back to the old world, but it is not at all clear what the new one will look like. The disorientation feels unsettling — but as we wrote in the 2025 Global Risk Report, this is what geopolitical transition looks like.
The end of the post-Cold War order
The unraveling of the post-Cold War order is no longer a matter of speculation — it is happening in real time. In just 60 days we’ve witnessed the rupture of the transatlantic alliance at Munich, the United States’ deepening ties with Russia, France’s offer to extend its nuclear umbrella to the European Union, Germany’s decision to exempt defense spending from its constitutional debt limits (the so-called “debt brake”), and Washington’s escalation of trade hostilities beyond its immediate neighbors.
What is emerging is not a new stable order, but a fragmented and unstable multipolar one. A tripolar world — with spheres of influence dominated by Washington, Moscow, and Beijing — is no longer hypothetical. While multipolarity has been discussed for years, the speed and intensity of this transition are profoundly destabilizing. It is not clear if the rules and institutions designed 80 years ago for a world of 50 countries can be reformed to meet this radical geopolitical realignment in a world with 193 states.
The central question that decision-makers are asking everywhere is whether this multipolar order will be defined by a “rule of the strong” or by a renewed commitment to multilateralism. The answer is that it is still early to say. What is clear is that the institutions that once defined the liberal order — the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO) — are facing an existential threat like no other.
What we are witnessing is not so much deglobalization as a shift toward post-globalization — a reorganization of global trade and capital flows shaped more by state interests than market dynamics. Trade is not disappearing but is instead being rerouted along political fault lines. New multiregional alliances are emerging — as are processes I refer to as re-globalization - but they remain volatile and fragile.
At least two forces are driving this geopolitical transition: geopolitical fragmentation and rising political instability.
Geopolitical fragmentation
Geopolitical fragmentation is deepening because the so-called liberal rules-based order — a term that few embrace but most understand — is under siege. The most surprising pressure point comes from within: the United States, the very architect of this order, now seems intent on dismantling it. Trump 2.0, unencumbered by constraints, is leading the charge.
To be sure, the shift toward multipolarity hardly comes as a shock. Afterall, countries like Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa have pursued “strategic autonomy” for decades. Today, the Global South accounts for 40% of global GDP and nearly 80% of global GDP growth. Indeed, the multipolar moment arrived some time ago — but the institutions and norms of the old order may not survive the transition.
The most dramatic shift since the publication of the 2025 GRR, a publication that I’ve contributed to since 2019, is the posture of the United States. The current administration has acted with startling precision in executing the blueprint laid out in Project 2025 — a strategic plan developed by conservative think tanks to consolidate American primacy and roll back multilateral commitments.
Over the past two months, the White House has not only dismantled the so-called “administrative deep state” at home; it has also targeted the “globalist deep state” abroad. A 36-question survey recently sent to all US-funded UN agencies, charities, and nonprofits asked about their positions on migration, abortion, free speech, and their commitment to Trump’s “America First” doctrine. The message was clear: fall in line and/or face defunding.
While the shock and awe strategy of Trump 2.0 is intended to sow chaos and confusion, there is a method in this. At least on the foreign policy front, Washington’s top priority is to win the strategic race against China and everything else is a distraction. The “pivot to Asia” began under Obama, but it now extends into military, financial, technological, and even space domains. The logic is straightforward: while the US remains the world’s most powerful country, China’s rise has eroded American dominance in both real and relative terms.
Today, Beijing is now seen as the only credible rival to US supremacy. This also explains Washington’s newfound willingness to repair ties with Russia — a “Nixon-in-Reverse” strategy. The goal is to isolate China while preventing Moscow from being drawn fully into Beijing’s orbit. Given recent joint declarations, military exercises, alliance building and most importantly, deepening trade between China and Russia, the United States will find its approach hard going.
The risks of the United State-China relations going off the rails are stark. Trump’s recent tariffs and China’s reciprocal measures suggest that the relationship is souring. Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” — the tendency for rising and declining powers to clash — appears more relevant than ever. At Davos, Allison estimated the probability of conflict between the US and China at over 75%, though he did say that war was not inevitable and offramps should be aggressively pursued.
Other large and middle powers are adjusting to the volatile multipolar world. The BRICS+ bloc (now including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE) was already exploring alternatives to the US-dominated financial system before Trump arrived — including a potential rival to the dollar. Trump has already threatened a 150% tariff if such efforts materialize, and Brazil quickly climbed down shortly thereafter.
Meanwhile, faced with the reality that United States security guarantees and backstopping of NATO are in jeopardy, Western Europe is scrambling to adjust. The EU’s €800 billion “ReArm” defense fund reflects growing anxiety over its strategic vulnerability to Russia, which it expects to ramp-up digital and physical threats. Global military spending hit a post-Cold War high last year, and further increases are expected.
The EU is mostly united in their rising disappointment with Trump 2.0, and are busily negotiating next steps. Yet European cohesion remains fragile. The threats to Ukrainian sovereignty and the rise of far-right populism threatens to fracture the bloc from within. The recent surge of electoral victories for nationalist parties — from Germany’s AfD to France’s National Rally — points to deep political fissures and the next election cycle will prove defining.
Political instability
There are darker undercurrents suggesting the emergence of a “spheres of influence” global order. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric — once dismissed as hyperbole — is beginning to feel disturbingly real. Suggestions of annexing Greenland, turning Canada into the 51st state, or reclaiming the Panama Canal no longer seem so outlandish. And as recent election contests in Greenland and Canada have shown, a majority of voters are leaning toward politicians who reject United States intervention.
Orwell’s vision of a tripolar world described in 1984 — Oceania (Washington), Eurasia (Moscow), and Eastasia (Beijing) — suddenly feels plausible. If Washington pursues more muscular interventions in Greenland, Panama or Canada, Moscow could feel emboldened to restore the Yalta borders and move from Ukraine to Moldova, Georgia, Latvia and beyond. China, for its part, might be more inclined to pursue its territorial ambitions in Taiwan, or the South China Sea.
Political instability is the other defining feature of this transition. Democratic backsliding — a 15-year trend — shows no signs of reversing. The 2025 GRR identified conflict as the top geopolitical threat. And as I noted in a recent article, there are now more than 60 active conflicts worldwide — the highest number since the Second World War. Hopes for progress in Ukraine and Gaza remain fragile. Few expect Russia or Israel to abide by ceasefires.
The underlying drivers of conflict are intensifying. Economic stagnation, climate shocks, the disruptive effects of AI, and deepening political polarization all point to a future of heightened instability. Meanwhile, the risk of nuclear proliferation is growing. Canada, Germany, Japan, Poland and South Korea are openly debating the need for nuclear weapons. Gulf states are weighing their options. All the while, the global framework for nuclear non-proliferation is fraying.
What makes all this even more troubling is that political instability is increasing just as global relief and development assistance is collapsing. The US just cut USAID by 83% - about 30% of the ODA just disappeared. Major donors in Europe are also refocusing on domestic priorities. That’s leaving an enormous vacuum — and China and Russia are already moving to fill it.
Facing up to reality
What does this mean for businesses and governments? Greater protectionism, increased regulatory divergence, disrupted supply chains, and higher political risk premiums. The IMF has already warned of slower global growth in 2025 and beyond. Of course, not everyone will lose. Canada, Mexico, and the EU will suffer, but countries like Vietnam, India, and Chile could benefit from trade realignment and supply chain diversification.
It is not a pretty picture — but it is better to confront geopolitical reality as it is, not as we wish it to be. This is not the end of globalization — but it is the end of the global order and globalization as we knew them. The future will be more fragmented, more unstable — and far more competitive. This is not inevitable — but it is where we are now. The challenge is how to navigate it.
See the March 13 video on global risks with WEF: https://mimir.mjoll.no/shares/o7CfQ1jxRQu_8LDq7A8qgA
Read the 2025 Global Risk Report at: https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2025/
Read the 2025 article on the risks of conflict: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/global-risks-report-conflict-global-cooperation/
Read the latest 2025 article on anticipatory governance to face rising risks: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/anticipatory-governance-for-a-risky-world/